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The route to take-up: 
raising incentives or lowering barriers? 
THE ROUTE TO TAKE-UP: RAISING INCENTIVES OR LOWERING BARRIERS? 
 
Welfare support to poor individuals in the United Kingdom is mostly delivered through means-tested 
benefits, requiring a preliminary assessment of claimants’ financial resources. In principle this form of 
delivery represents the most efficient way of reducing poverty, as public resources are spent only for 
those in need. However, a sizeable proportion of individuals entitled to receive welfare benefits do not 
claim them. This phenomenon, known as non take-up, endangers the effectiveness of means-tested 
programs and has therefore caught the attention of policy makers and social science researchers. 
 
Seemingly an irrational behaviour, non take-up has been explained by economists as the result of a 
rational decision in which an entitled individual compares the financial gain from claiming (the amount 
of benefit receivable) with the costs inherent in claiming (the hassle of acquiring the relevant 
information and going through the claiming process and social stigma related to welfare dependence) 
and concludes that the expected benefit does not compensate adequately for the costs.  
 
This work investigates policy interventions designed to raise the take-up of welfare benefits, 
considering two possible routes. One is to increase the financial incentive to claim – the amount of 
benefit receivable. The other possibility is to lower claim costs, for example through simplified 
application procedures and benefit rules, and information campaigns. This route implies potentially 
different consequences for the public welfare budget and the social acceptability of benefit dependence. 
 
The analysis exploits a policy reform to the income support scheme available to British pensioners, the 
introduction of Pension Credit in 2003. The reform increased the benefit amount for a subgroup of 
eligible pensioners and was accompanied by a publicity campaign aimed at lowering information costs 
and stigma. The application process was also changed into a more claimant-friendly form. Because 
only a subgroup of pensioners exposed to the ‘lowering barriers’ policies was also affected by the 
increase in the benefit level, it is possible to use the difference in the way pensioners were ‘treated’ by 
the reform to identify the distinct role of the ‘raising incentive’ and ‘lowering barriers’ policies. Both 
can be evaluated comparing the take-up behaviour of eligible pensioners observed before and after the 
reform came into force. 
 
Results support the idea that raising the benefit level has been an effective way of fostering new claims. 
In contrast, no evidence of an increase in take-up due to the ‘lowering barriers’ policies per se has been 
found, even though these policies seem to have partially enhanced the effect of financial incentives 
when concurrently applied.  
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Abstract
This paper investigates which measures are effective in promoting the take-up of welfare
support, considering both financial incentives and policies intended to lower claiming costs.
The analysis uses an exogenous policy change, the introduction of the Pension Credit in the
UK, that increased the entitlement amount for a subgroup of eligible pensioners, and was
accompanied by an advertisement campaign, reformed ‘light touch’ administration and a
more claimant-friendly application procedure. The behavioural response is identified using
parametric and non parametric analysis of repeated cross sections of FRS data. Results
consistently show the efficacy of increased financial incentives, while no effect is found for
the ‘lowering barriers’ policies when unaccompanied by concurrent raised monetary rewards.
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1 Introduction
Non take-up, that is a situation where individuals entitled to receive a government benefit
do not claim it, is generally regarded as a failure of welfare targeting, as it compromises the
effectiveness of means tested1 programs, which otherwise represent the most cost-efficient
way of delivering welfare support. Economic research on non take-up was developed mainly
in the US and the UK (see Currie 2004 for a recent review), where a substantial com-
ponent of the social security system relies on means testing; but is also growing in other
OECD countries (Hernanz et al. 2004). Studies have focussed on measuring take-up rates
across different social programs and population subgroups; on investigating which personal
or program characteristics are related to claiming; and on trying to identify which factors
(‘barriers’) are responsible for non take-up behaviour. However, despite general agreement
about the undesirability of non take-up, little attention has been dedicated to identifying
the type of policy measures that would most effectively succeed in triggering claims.
Since Moffitt‘s (1983) seminal model of non-take-up, economists have represented take-up
as utility maximising choice, where individuals compare the disutility inherent in claiming -
due to stigma, transaction costs or cost of acquiring information - with the expected utility
of the financial gain that take-up would entail. Economic theory therefore predicts that
higher benefit entitlements will increase take-up.2 The role of the expected benefit amount
as a trigger of take-up is the most consistent empirical finding so far. Several studies have
obtained this result exploiting the cross-sectional variation of entitlement levels across the
eligible population. A few have gone further towards causality, by using exogenous changes
in programs’ parameters to identify the take-up elasticity to entitlement amounts (Anderson
et al. 1997; Blank et al. 1991; Dahan et al. 2007; Zantomio et al. 2008). However, using
financial incentives as take-up triggers might entail disadvantages such as increased fiscal
1While non take-up is not exclusively confined to means-tested benefits, it is with this type of programs
that it proves to be most serious.
2If barriers are fixed, independent of the benefit amount. This seems to be the case according to the
empirical evidence found so far.
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burden, political acceptance concerns and the worsening of the poverty trap inherent in
means-tested programs.
Lowering the barriers to claiming could be considered as another route to take-up.
Claimant-friendly application procedures, simplified benefit rules, advertising campaigns and
automatic enrolment in programs are a few examples of measures that have been suggested
(Hernanz et al. 2004) as potentially promising. Knowledge about the importance of different
types of barrier - stigma, transaction costs, or lack of information- would indicate which type
of policy initiatives should be pursued. However, evidence on this is mixed and inconclusive.
Barriers to claiming are mostly unobservable in available data and identification of each
of them using individual characteristics as proxies is problematic, as these are potentially
correlated with several types of barriers.
Some studies have stressed the role played by information costs. Perceived ineligibility
for example was found to be a major determinant of non take-up (Coe 1979, Daponte et
al.1999). Dahan et al. (2006) found that longer exposure to the incentive to look for
information significantly increased take-up probability in the context of a non means tested
water price benefit in Israel. The low take-up probability found for residents of small cities
(Bramley et al.2000), and the high one for individuals already receiving welfare (Blundell et
al.1988; Dorsett et al. 1991; Zedlewski and Brauner 1993) might also be considered as indirect
evidence of the role played by information. However, they could also be due to difference
in administrative costs, potentially higher in rural areas (Edmonds 2002, Warlick 1982)
and lower for recipients already accustomed to benefit administration (Blundell et al.1988).
The potential relevance of administration costs (Koning et al., 1997; Blank et al. 1996) is
reinforced also by the finding that uncertainty about the outcome of a claim discourages
take-up (Halpern et al. 1986). Instead, the evidence of lower take-up by more socially active
individuals and pensioners -regarded as more adverse to ‘government handouts”’ (Kayser et
al. 2000; Andrade 2002)- has been related to the presence of stigma-type of barriers.
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Still, very little is known about individuals’ responsiveness to policies aimed at lowering
barriers to claiming. This study follows a quasi-experimental approach to investigate how
individuals’ claiming behaviour responds to increases in financial rewards and to policies
intended to reduce ‘barriers’ e.g. the non monetary costs of claiming. The exogenous policy
change used is the introduction of the Pension Credit, which modified the income support
scheme available to British Pensioners in 2003. The reformed more generous entitlement
rules were accompanied by a publicity campaign aimed at lowering information costs and
stigma, a reformed ‘light touch’ claims administration and a friendlier application procedure.
Since the available panel data do not offer adequate sample size or the necessary detailed
income and assets information, the analysis instead uses two cross sections of the Family
Resources Survey. The first provides a sample of pensioners interviewed up to six months
before the reform and the second a sample of pensioners interviewed after the reform came
into force. Potential pre-benefit income endogeneity is addressed by restricting the sample
to older pensioners, for whom employment rates are negligible. While the random design
of the survey sampling and the exogenous nature of the Pension Credit reform rule out
the chance of endogenous selection into the pre- or post-reform samples, bias might arise
from different patterns of non response and of covariates distribution in the two samples.
Following a ‘selection on observables’ approach, the average reform effect on the take-up
behaviour of pensioners is identified using a range of parametric and non parametric evalua-
tion techniques, including parametric regression, matching on variables and propensity score
matching. Because only a subgroup of previously eligible pensioners exposed to ‘lowering
barriers’ policies was de facto affected by the more generous benefit rules through an in-
crease in financial entitlement, it is possible to exploit the differences in the way pensioners
were ‘treated’ by the reform to identify the distinct role played by the ‘raising incentive’
and ‘lowering barriers’ initiatives and in particular the responsiveness to the second type of
measures.
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Any successful way of fostering benefit claiming is of interest to governments, as raised
take-up improves the poverty alleviation efficacy of targeted programs; but also the way
take-up increase is achieved matters. Firstly, the adoption of ‘lowering barriers’, rather than
‘raising incentives’ policies, might bear different implications for fiscal balances. Secondly,
‘lowering barriers’ measures aimed at delivering the agreed welfare expenditure, rather than
increasing its level (as raising financial incentives would imply), might also gather more
social and political consensus, even if the same amount of public resources were dedicated to
either type of measure. Moreover, from a microeconomic point of view, ‘lowering barriers’
policies would not add to the poverty trap as ‘raising incentives’ could do. However, there
are doubts about the effectiveness of the ‘lowering barriers’ route. If the government is
interested in improving target effectiveness by investing in either or both type of measures,
the optimal share of public resources to be allocated to each measure depends crucially on
their relative effectiveness in generating new claims. A balanced mixture of measures is more
likely to be optimal the higher their interacted effectiveness, relative to the effectiveness of
each of them implemented separately. Knowledge about individuals’ responsiveness to each
type of measure and their interaction therefore emerges as the key to identifying which policy
initiatives should be pursued to improve target effectiveness: this constitutes the objective of
the following empirical analysis. Besides contributing to the international take-up literature
by providing some evidence on the way individuals’ respond to ‘lowering barriers’ policies
and therefore the viability of such route, this study also offers the first rigorous evaluation
of the impact of Pension Credit on the take-up of welfare support by British pensioners.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. The Pension Credit reform is detailed in
Section 2, covering both modified entitlement rules and the further measures intended to
lower claiming barriers. Section 3 presents the evaluation setting and identification strategy.
The data description and the implementation of the econometric analysis are carried out in
Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and the final section concludes.
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2 The Pension Credit reform
2.1 Background: pensioners take-up in the UK
Despite a remarkable improvement in pensioners’ relative economic position in the course of
the last century and several recent government measures, approximately one in five British
pensioners is currently estimated to live in relative poverty (DWP 2008; Eurostat 2006).
For several decades, public pension provision in the UK has been delivered through the
contributory Basic State Pension and a means tested income top-up for those with incomplete
contribution histories. As in other OECD countries, the role of means testing in public
provision for old age has become more prominent: the Basic State Pension has decreased in
real terms, while Income Support increased in real terms. However, a low pensioner take-up
rate, fluctuating around 70 % of eligible pensioners in the years prior to PC introduction
(DWP 2004, DWP 2005, DWP 2006), has compromised the effectiveness of the British
means-tested program for the elderly, and has been the object of considerable policy and
academic interest (Costigan et al. 1999; McConaghy et al. 2003; Talbot et al 2005; Bunt et
al. 2006; Pudney et al. 2006; Hernandez et al. 2007; Zantomio et al. 2008). While complete
take-up of income support would not in itself suffice to eradicate pensioner poverty (Brewer
et al. 2007), it could significantly reduce its depth. Increasing take-up could also represent
a cost-effective way of reducing pensioner poverty, if compared to more expensive options
such as the introduction of a universal or/and more generous Basic State Pension (Brewer
et al. 2007).
2.2 The change in entitlement rules: raising monetary incentives
The introduction of Pension Credit(PC) has been one of the major policy changes aimed
at reducing pensioner poverty in the last decade. The PC reformed the pre-existing means
tested income support scheme available to people aged 60 or older, known as Minimum
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Income Guarantee (MIG) at the time. MIG and PC policy parameters applying at the time
of the transition to PC are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Minimum Income Guarantee and Pension Credit rates, 2003/04 £per week,
single pensioner pensioner couple
MIG PC MIG PC
Needs:
Basic Allowance MIG and GC 102.10 102.10 155.80 155.80
Severe Disability premium 42.90 42.90 85.80 85.80
Carer premium 25.10 25.10 50.20 50.20
Saving Credit treshold - 77.35 - 123.80
Maximum Saving Credit - 14.79 - 19.20
Capital limits 6,000-12,000 6,000+ 6,000-12,000 6,000+
Capital means ratio 1 every 250 1 every 500 1 every 250 1 every 500
Source: CPAG(2003/04)
The MIG worked by topping up income to a ‘Basic Allowance’ level, uprated yearly by
the government, varying according to pensioners partnership status and awarding additional
‘premium’ amounts for disability and care needs (‘Severe Disability’ and ‘Carer’ premiums).
The unit of assessment, both for the means test and the definition of needs, was the ‘pensioner
unit’, comprising the individual pensioner, if single, or both members of a couple, if either
of them satisfied the age condition. The means test took into account all income from
private and public sources (excluding a few disability benefits and other means-tested benefits
helping with housing costs and local council tax), with the exception of capital income. This
was imputed as £1 of weekly income for every £250 of capital above £6,000. Eligibility was
lost if capital exceeded an upper limit of £12,000. The dashed line in Figure 1 represents
the amount of entitlement for increasing levels of ‘means’ under MIG rules. The means test
involved a 100% taper rate, so that each £1 of owned means would be lost as entitlement
from the ‘Basic allowance’ level.
The PC was introduced in October 2003 as a replacement for the MIG. A few changes
affected the means formula: the upper capital limit to eligibility was removed and the capital-
6
Figure 1: Entitlement structure under MIG and PC
to-means conversion rate was made more generous, changing to £1 of means imputed for
every £500 of capital held above £6,000. The reformed entitlement was composed of a
Guarantee Credit (GC) element, basically replicating the previous MIG (in terms of ‘Basic
Allowance’ and ‘premium’ amounts, and the 100% taper rate, represented by the same dashed
line in Figure1) and a new Saving Credit (SC) component of entitlement (represented by the
dark grey area in Figure 1) for people aged 65 or more whose means exceeded the ‘Saving
Credit threshold’, corresponding to the level of the contributory Basic State Pension. The
SC was intended to improve incentives to save for retirement and so a reduced 40% taper
rate was applied to means above the SC threshold; however its amount could not exceed a
defined ‘Maximum Saving Credit’.
After the introduction of the PC the ‘poorest’ pensioners continued to be entitled to
the same amount as under the MIG (now called GC) and did not experience any increase
in entitlement. However, those with accumulated means above the ‘SC threshold’, or with
capital exceeding £6,000 were ‘rewarded’ by a reform induced entitlement increase because
of the new SC3 component of entitlement and the new capital conversion rate respectively.
3Its introduction brought into the program pensioners that otherwise would be ineligible to the Guarantee
Credit, and previous MIG, because of too high means. However, this group of pensioners is not of interest
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2.3 Concurrent measures: lowering barriers
Besides tackling pensioner poverty and improving incentives to save for retirement, the gov-
ernment declared aims in introducing the PC included increasing the take-up amongst pen-
sioners through lowering claiming costs. To this end, several policy initiatives were under-
taken. On the benefit administration side, a new Pension Services was created, involving
‘local partners’ such as voluntary organisations, physically closer to claimants and ready to
visit them at home if required. To ease the application process, a freephone national tele-
phone line was instituted. While under MIG the application process was completed through
written correspondence or face to face interviews in local offices, the telephone line allowed
the administration to post completed application forms to applicants, ready for them to sign.
The means test was made less intrusive: private transfers from families and friends did not
need to be reported any more; and income or other personal circumstances would only need
to be re-checked every five years, rather than claimants having to communicate any change
to avoid being fined.
Between April 2003 and April 2004, a targeted mailing campaign took place, whereby
6.8 million pensioners not yet receiving MIG were sent a letter informing them of the PC,
and the chance that they might be entitled to it4. However, the letter did not work as a
form of automatic enrolment; pensioners were not told about how much their entitlement
would have been and would still need to complete the application process to know that. A
media marketing campaign ‘Pick it up: it’s yours’, involving both television and press, was
launched in September 2003, with the purpose of informing but also influencing pensioners’
attitudes towards what was often perceived as a ‘government handout’.
An omnibus survey conducted between April and May 2004 (Age Concern 2004) showed
widespread awareness about the existence of PC among pensioners, as 89% of those inter-
for the present work, as they did not face a pre-reform take-up decision. Moreover, newly entitled have been
found to take time to adjust to new policy rules (Hernandez et al. 2007).
4Pensioner already receiving the MIG were instead sent a letter informing them about their transfer to
the PC with effect from October 2003.
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viewed reported having heard about it, and that the most common source of information was
direct mailing, followed by media and the Pension Service5. Another omnibus survey (Talbot
et al. 2005) conducted in November 2004 found that 81% of the interviewed pensioners had
heard about PC, but two thirds of them reported having done nothing as a consequence and
35% reported that ‘nothing could be done’ to convince them to claim.
The government claimed that the PC campaign was effective in increasing take-up, as
‘for every £1 spent for it, £55 more benefits were paid out’ (CAG 2006). However additional
benefits paid out do not in themselves imply that the campaign was effective in increas-
ing take-up, as more people became eligible as a consequence of the PC introduction or
might have claimed it anyway. The following analysis will make a more rigorous analysis of
individuals‘ response to the campaign.
3 Evaluating the take-up response
3.1 Evaluation setting
Consider a population of pensioner units indexed by i, and two time periods t = 0, before
the PC introduction, and t = 1, after the PC introduction. Denote by eri the benefit amount
pensioner unit i is entitled to under the benefit rules applying in period t = r, so that
er=0i indicates the entitlement under the pre-reform rules, and e
r=1
i the entitlement under
the post-reform rules. Also, denote with bl the level of barriers to claim faced under the
application environment in place at time t = l, so that b0 and bl would capture social
attitude, information and application costs before and after the PC reform respectively.
The take-up outcome can only be meaningfully defined for pensioner units eligible for
income support; therefore the analysis is based on the subset of the pensioner population
defined as
P = {i|e0i > 0}
5Previously friends and family had been reported as the most common way of hearing about MIG.
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Note that because entitlement rules were relaxed in a more generous direction with the
introduction of PC, any pensioner unit entitled under MIG rules would also be entitled
under PC rules. The outcome of interest is defined as T r,lt,i , a binary indicator for take-up
of pensioner unit i in period t under entitlement rules r and barriers level l, where T r,lt,i = 1
indicates take-up and T r,lt,i = 0 indicates non take-up. In each period a sample of pensioner
units is observed; the binary indicator St,i takes the value 1 if i is observed in t, and 0
otherwise6. Therefore in each period t, if St,i = 1, T
r=t,l=t
t,i , e
r=t
i , e
r=1−t
i and a set of other
characteristics Xt,i are observed.
3.2 The impact of the overall PC reform
The PC introduction changed both e0i to e
1
i and b
0 to b1. To identify the causal impact of
the overall reform on take-up behaviour, one would ideally want to observe both of the T 1,1t,i
and T 0,0t,i potential outcomes and base the identification of the behavioural response on
∆t = E(T
1,1
t − T
0,0
t ) t = 0, 1
However only T 1,10,i in period t = 0 and T
0,0
1,i in period t = 1 are observable. This type
of setting is representative of the ‘evaluation problem’ where causal inference requires the
comparison of two potential outcome but only one of them is observed (Cochran and Rubin,
1973; Roy, 1951). The issue then becomes finding a ‘counterfactual’ that can best represent
the unobserved outcome, e.g. the take-up behaviour of pensioner units observed after the
PC reform, had they not been exposed to it. Following an approach previously adopted
(Zantomio, Pudney and Hacock 2008) the appropriate counterfactual for i observed in t will
be ‘built’ drawing from the sample of pensioners observed in 1− t .
Identification of ∆t requires the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 St ⊥ T
r,l
t | Xt = x, ∀r, l t = 0, 1
6St,i = 0 covers pensioner units not sampled by the survey, survey non response, item non response
preventing entitlement assessment and cases excluded because of the sample restrictions explained in section
4.1.
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Assumption 2 0 < Pr(S1−t = 1|X1−t = x) < 1, ∀x observed in t = 0, 1
Assumption 3 E(T r,lt |Xt = x) is independent of t ∀r, l t = 0, 1
Assumption 1 requires that, conditionally on a given value x of observable characteristics
X, any potential outcome is independent of i being observed in period t or not. In other
words, we assume that there are no unobserved confounding characteristic according to which
pensioner units would be non randomly assigned to the pre-reform or post-reform observed
sample. Assumption 2 concerns the joint distribution of observable covariates X and St and
requires ‘overlap’ in the cross-sectional distribution of Xt across t = 1 and t = 0. Assumption
3 requires no confounding macro-level factors, other than those already captured by Xt, e
r
i
and bl.
If Assumption 1 holds, then
E(T 0,01 |X1 = x) = E(T
0,0
0 |X0 = x)
E(T 1,10 |X0 = x) = E(T
1,1
1 |X1 = x)
and therefore, conditioning on observables, ∆t(x) can be re-written as
∆1(x) = E(T
1,1
1 − T
0,0
1 |X1 = x) = E(T
1,1
1 − T
0,0
0 |X1 = x,X0 = x)
∆0(x) = E(T
1,1
0 − T
0,0
0 |X0 = x) = E(T
1,1
1 − T
0,0
0 |X1 = x,X0 = x)
Under assumption 2, these expectations can be estimated for all values of x ∈ St and
integrated over. Under further Assumption 3 the overall effect of the PC reform is identified.
This will reflect the take-up response to any policy measure undertaken as part of the PC
reform., eg. the combined effect of lowered barriers and improved incentives. Different ways
of implementing conditioning on x and consequent estimators for ∆t are detailed in section
3.4.
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3.3 Which role for different policy instruments?
In addition to the evaluation of the overall reform effect, a second research question involves
disentangling the role played by the different types of policy instruments involved. To this
end remember that while the post reform claiming environment was experienced by all eligible
pensioner units, only a subgroup were ‘treated’ with raised monetary reward from claiming,
thanks to the reformed entitlement rules. More formally, the set P can be partitioned into
P 1 = {i ∈ P |e0i = e
1
i , b
0 > b1}
P 2 = {i ∈ P |e0i < e
1
i , b
0 > b1}
Because of the different treatments they received, P 1 and P 2 require distinct approaches.
Consider P 1 first and define ∆P
1
t as ∆t,i∈P 1 . Because e
0
i = e
1
i it follows that
T 0,00,i∈P 1 = T
1,0
0,i∈P 1
T 1,11,i∈P 1 = T
0,1
1,i∈P 1
Therefore, conditioning on observables, ∆P
1
t (x) can be re written as
∆P
1
1 (x) = E(T
1,1
1 − T
0,0
1 |X1 = x) = E(T
1,1
1 − T
0,0
0 |X1 = x,X0 = x) =
= E(T 1,11 − T
1,0
1 |X1 = x,X0 = x)
or
∆P
1
0 (x) = E(T
1,1
0 − T
0,0
0 |X0 = x) = E(T
1,1
1 − T
0,0
0 |X1 = x,X0 = x) =
= E(T 0,11 − T
1,0
1 |X1 = x,X0 = x)
This allows us to evaluate the impact of the reformed claiming environment on the take-
up of those not exposed to any additional financial incentive, i.e. the effect of lowered barriers
per se.
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Define now ∆P
2
t as ∆t,i∈P 2 . Disentangling the separate role played by lowered barriers,
raised incentives and their interaction in the case of P 2 is more problematic, because they
acted as concurrent treatments. It is however possible to get some further understanding
about their effectiveness. One way to gauge the role played by financial incentives could
be the non parametric comparison of ∆P
2
t for increasing intervals of entitlement. However,
the most interesting research questions remains that of evaluating whether the concurrent
lowering barrier policies played any role, possibly interacting with the benefit increase. Define
the following estimand
Λt = E(T
1,1
t − T
0,1
t )− E(T
1,0
t − T
0,0
t )
where the expectation of the change in take-up due to raised financial incentives, under the
pre-reform claiming environment, is subtracted from the expected take-up response to the
same increase in financial incentives but under the reformed claiming environment. ΛP
2
t
therefore reflects any difference in the behaviuoral response to the raised financial incentives
activated by the lowering barrier policies, or the behavioural response that would not have
happened without the reformed claiming environment. Identification of ΛP
2
t however requires
a further assumption:
Assumption 4 E(T 0,0t |Xt = x, e
0 = e˜) = E(T 1,0t |Xt = x, e
1 = e˜),
E(T 1,1t |Xt = x, e
0 = eˆ) = E(T 1,1t |Xt = x, e
1 = eˆ), ∀x, ∀e0, e1, t = 0, 1
In other words, it is assumed that, under unchanged claiming environment, the way in
which individuals respond to different entitlement levels - the decision rule, for any given level
of entitlement, inherent in their utility function- is not altered by the change in entitlement
rules alone. This type of assumption has been adopted in evaluation settings (Ichimura et
al. 2000; Todd et al. 2006) where ex-ante variation in policy instruments is used to predict
behaviuoral responses to exogenous manipulations of those instruments. Following a similar
approach, cross sectional variation in the entitlement levels for pensioner units observed
under MIG rules and the pre-reform claiming environment can be exploited to predict what
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the behavioural response to entitlement change only would have been, had the claiming
environment stayed the same. Under Assumption 4, and conditioning on x and e, Λt can be
written as
Λt(x, e) = E(T
1,1
1 |X1 = x, e
1 = e¯)− E(T 0,11 |X1 = x, e
1 = e˜)−
−[E(T 1,00 |X0 = x, e
0 = e¯)− E(T 0,00 |X0 = x, e
0 = e˜)]
where e¯ is the level that a pensioner unit entitled to e˜ under MIG benefit rules would be
entitled to under PC benefit rules. If these expectations can be estimated for all values of x
and e and integrated over, corresponding estimators of ΛP
2
0 and Λ
P 2
1 can be calculated.
3.4 Methods
There are different ways in which conditioning on observables can be performed, and es-
timators derived. One possibility is to use regression methods to estimate the conditional
probability of relevant take-up outcomes, and then average their difference over the distribu-
tion of observed covariates. The take-up probability for those simulated to be entitled can
be parametrically modeled: adopting the probit specification, the conditional probability of
take-up for pensioner unit i under entitlement rules r and claiming environment b can be
written as
Φ(zri βb)
where zi denotes the covariates, including the amount of entitlement under rules r, and a
set of socio-economic characteristics, Φ the standard normal distribution function, and the
subscript b on the coefficients vector βb reflects the pre or post reform claiming environment
under which the estimation sample is observed. Prediction of the conditional probabilities
Φ(z1βˆ1) and Φ(z
0βˆ0) allows us to estimate ∆t by either of
∆ˆrp1 =
1
N1
∑
i
(
Φ(z1βˆ1)− Φ(z
0βˆ0)
)
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and
∆ˆrp0 =
1
N0
∑
i
(
Φ(z1βˆ1)− Φ(z
0βˆ0)
)
where N1 and N0 denote the post-reform and pre-reform sample numbers respectively. Al-
ternatively, the predicted conditional probability of the observed outcome can be replaced
by its realization, with the advantage of reducing the scope for misspecification bias:
∆ˆra1 =
1
N1
∑
i
(
T 1,11 − Φ(z
0βˆ0)
)
and
∆ˆra0 =
1
N0
∑
i
(
Φ(z1βˆ1)− T
0,0
0
)
Analogously, Λt can be estimated by either
Λˆrp1 =
1
N1
∑
i
(
(Φ(z1βˆ1)− Φ(z
0βˆ1))− (Φ(z
1βˆ0)− Φ(z
0βˆ0)
)
and
Λˆrp0 =
1
N0
∑
i
(
(Φ(z1βˆ1)− Φ(z
0βˆ1))− (Φ(z
1βˆ0)− Φ(z
0βˆ0)
)
or, using the actual realization of observed outcomes,
Λˆra1 =
1
N1
∑
i
(
(T 1,11 − Φ(z
0βˆ1))− (Φ(z
1βˆ0)− Φ(z
0βˆ0)
)
and
Λˆra0 =
1
N0
∑
i
(
(Φ(z1βˆ1 − Φ(z
0βˆ1))− (Φ(z
1βˆ0)− T
0,0
0 )
)
Despite the reduced scope for misspecification bias of ∆ra over ∆rp, the regression based
approach anyway relies on the correct specification of the conditional probability function.
However another possibility is to follow the non-parametric route and use matching estima-
tors. In this case, for any i observed in t, the outcome of pensioner unit j observed in (1− t)
is used as counterfactual outcome, where j is selected to be the ‘nearest’ to i according to a
distance function M(i, j) of conditioning covariates x.
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Matching estimators for ∆t can be derived as
∆ˆm1 =
1
N1
∑
i
(
T 1,11,i − T
0,0
0,j∗(i)
)
where i ∈ N1, j
∗(i) ∈ N0 and M(i, j
∗(i)) <= M(i, j) ∀j ∈ N0; or as
∆ˆm0 =
1
N0
∑
j
(
T 1,11,i∗(j) − T
0,0
0,j
)
where i∗(j) ∈ N1, j ∈ N0 and M(i
∗(j), j) <= M(i, j) ∀i ∈ N1, when covariates observed in
the pre-reform sample are assumed as baseline.
Estimation of Λt can also be based on the comparison of pairs of pensioners units matched
across the pre-reform and post-reform samples, as in
Λˆrpm1 =
1
N1
∑
i
(
(T 1,11,i − Φ(z
0
i βˆ1))− (Φ(z
1
j∗(i)βˆ0)− T
0,0
0,j∗(i))
)
where i ∈ N1, j
∗(i) ∈ N0 and M(i, j
∗(i)) <= M(i, j) ∀j ∈ N0; or
Λˆrpm0 =
1
N0
∑
j
(
(T 1,11,i∗(j) − Φ(z
0
i∗(j)βˆ1))− (Φ(z
1
j βˆ0)− T
0,0
0,j )
)
where i∗(j) ∈ N1, j ∈ N0 and M(i
∗(j), j) <= M(i, j) ∀i ∈ N1
7 8.
Any of the described estimators can be computed restricting observations in each sample
to their P 1 and P 2 partitions respectively. More detail on the implementation of the above
described methods is provided in section 4.3.
4 Implementation
4.1 The Family Resources Survey data
The Family Resources Survey(FRS) was launched by the British Department for Work and
Pensions in 1992 as large-scale cross-sectional population survey collecting detailed infor-
mation about different income sources, assets held and benefit receipt, as well as standard
7Again, actual realization of observed outcomes T 1,1
1
and T 0,0
0
can be replaced by their parametric pre-
dictions Φ(z1βˆ1) and Φ(z
0βˆ0) and corresponding estimators Λˆ
ram
0
and Λˆram
1
derived.
8A purely non parametric version of Λˆt would involve 3 concurrent matching algorithms and result in
poor conditioning quality given available sample numbers.
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household and personal characteristics. The fieldwork period mirrors the UK fiscal policy
year, spanning from April to the March of the following calendar year. Because of its large
sample size (approximately 65 thousand individuals) and topics covered, it represents the
reference dataset for government official take-up statistics and has been used in several pre-
vious analysis of take-up behaviour in the United Kingdom (Hancock et al.2005; Hernandez
et al. 2007; Pudney et al. 2006; Zantomio et al. 2008). A preliminary step in the empirical
analysis of claiming behaviour is the simulation of benefit entitlements, based on individuals
means, necessary to determine who belongs to the sample of eligible pensioners facing the
take-up decision. The FRS level of detail in recording income and assets information makes
it particularly suited to the task9.
The present empirical analysis is based on the 2002/03 and 2004/05 surveys, sampling
8,599 and 8,625 pensioner units respectively. Figure 2 depicts the timing of each sample
fieldwork and relevant policy initiatives. The exclusion of the FRS 2003/04 sample leaves
out pensioner units interviewed while the mailing and media campaign took place and allows
for the transition to PC to be completed before the fieldwork for the post-reform sample
began. The exclusion of the six months prior to the reform addresses potential problems
related to anticipated adjustments to expected policy changes.
***** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *****
Before the simulation of entitlements, samples were restricted according to five different
criteria ensuring a reasonable degree of accuracy in the entitlement simulation. Restrictions
excluded pensioner units living with further individuals in the household; where any member
was aged below 5 years from pension minimum age; reporting a pending mortgage, earnings
or maintenance received from an absent spouse. The inclusion of any such type would have
involved an increased scope for measurement error, known to seriously undermine non take-
up analysis (Duclos 1995; Hernandez and Pudney, 2007). Moreover the age and no-earnings
9Available UK panel data such as ELSA and BHPS suffer from significantly lower sample sizes; and
moreover in the BHPS case financial assets information is not available for the years of interest.
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conditions address the potential endogeneity arising from the retirement timing decision.
Such restrictions reduced samples sizes by approximately one third. Further cases had to be
discarded when providing insufficient income or capital information. A series of procedures
were applied to detect and resolve inconsistencies in reported benefit receipts, in the spirit of
Hancock and Barker (2005)10. The resulting samples included 1,205 pensioner units eligible
to MIG in FRS 2002/03; and 863 pensioner units eligible to PC in FRS 2004/05 who would
have also been entitled to income support under MIG rules. From a comparison with the
overall population of UK pensioner in each corresponding year, as resulting from the FRS
(Table A1 in Appendix), as one might expect eligible pensioners in the two samples emerge
as a disadvantaged group, in terms of financial resources, council tax band -reflecting the
value of the accommodation-, tenure type and educational attainment. They also appear
less likely to be in a partnership, and more likely to be single women.
Table 2a reports the average take-up rates and entitlement levels in the pre-reform and
post-reform samples (first and second column) and their respective partitions between those
treated by ‘lowering barriers’ policies alone (P 1, in the third and fourth columns) and those
concurrently treated by the raised financial incentives (P 2, in the fifth and sixth columns).
***** TABLE 2a ABOUT HERE *****
Overall the post reform sample exhibits a higher average take-up, accompanied by higher
average entitlement level. Comparing the P 1 and P 2 partitions of both samples, pensioners in
the P 1 partition exhibit a remarkably higher average take-up than in P 2, paired with a higher
average pre and post reform entitlement. In fact, as seen in Figure 1, the P 1 partition includes
the ‘poorer’ pensioners, with higher entitlement levels resulting from their lower means, and
therefore having most to gain from claiming at any point in time. For pensioners in P 2, the
average entitlement appears remarkably higher in the post reform sample than in the pre-
reform one, reflecting their financial gain attained through the reformed entitlement rules.
10This applied mostly to cases confusing receipt of income support, retirement pension and disability
benefits when answering survey questions
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When subgroups of P 2 defined according to the size of reform induced increase in entitlement
are considered, a consistent pattern of higher average take-up for higher entitlement levels
emerges.
***** TABLE 2b ABOUT HERE *****
Table 2b produces the same figures separately for couples, single men and single women:
the average take-up in P 2 (those who did experience a reform induced entitlement increase)
is consistently higher in the post-reform sample than in the pre-reform one. Single women
generally exhibit a higher take-up rate than couples and single men; however, the difference
from couples’ average take-up rate is consistently lower when the post-reform samples are
considered.
***** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *****
Table 3 presents the sample mean and standard deviation of conditioning covariates, sepa-
rately for each treatment partition P 1 and P 2 of the pre- and post-reform samples. Covariates
include partnership status, gender, house tenure, receipt of disability benefits, years in em-
ployment, terminal education age, ethnicity, income and, for the post-reform sample only, a
dummy for being entitled to the SC component. The proportion of single women, non white,
low pre-benefit income and short employment histories is higher in the the P 1 partitions
of each sample, confirming the relatively disadvantaged economic position of those who did
not have their entitlement increased by the reform. In both the pre- and the post-reform
samples the average entitlement increases when PC, rather than MIG rules are applied, with
a slighlty higher increase registered under the post-reform sample covariates. As expected,
the vast majority of P 2 pensioners result entitled to the SC component under PC rules 11.
Figures in the columns reporting the ratio of the pre- and post- sample mean difference to
11The remaining minority experienced an increase in the GC component of PC entitlement due to more
generous capital rules, as explained in section 2.2
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the standard deviation provide no evidence of severe imbalances in covariates distribution
between the two samples.
4.2 Parametric modeling of take-up behaviour
The chosen specification for the probit index function includes a spline function of entitlement
with linear restrictions on coefficients bounding the function to be piecewise continuous.
This leads to the estimation of a take-up probability with entitlement elasticity varying for
different ranges of entitlement values.
To allow for potential structural instabilities entailed by the reformed claiming environ-
ment, maximum likelihood estimation can be performed separately for the pre-reform and
post-reform samples. Denoting entitlement by e, the remaining covariates by x and the
corresponding coefficients γ and η, take-up probability can be written as
Φ(α0 + eγ0 + x
′η0) if e < k1
Φ(α1 + eγ1 + x
′η1) if k1 <= e < k2
Φ(α2 + eγ2 + x
′η2) if e > k2
where knots k1 and k2 are set at £10 per week and £20 per week. Maximum likelihood
estimated marginal effects are produced in Table 4. The estimates proved not to be sensitive
to alternative specifications of the knot values.
***** TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE *****
Results appear in line with previous findings (Blundell et al. 1988; Hancock et al. 2005;
Pudney et al. 2006; Hernandez et al. 2007; Zantomio et al. 2008). The take-up probability
significantly increases with entitlement level; the reaction to higher entitlement levels is
particularly prominent for the £10-£20 per week range for both samples12. As previously
12Figure A1 plots the obtained predicted probability of take up estimated on each sample, for a repre-
sentative single man aged 75 years old, homeowner, educated above 14, white, who worked 33 year and has
a net income of £100 per week (continuous line) and for a representative single woman, aged 89 years old,
disabled, educated below 14, white, who worked 20 years and has a net income of £45 per week.
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found, the take-up probability is consistently lower for pensioners on higher pre-benefit
incomes and for more educated and non-white pensioners. Other work has related similar
findings to higher stigma perceived by more educated people and application difficulties for
members of ethnic minorities (Warlick 1982; Currie 2004; Hernanz 2004). When estimation
is performed on the pre-reform sample, home owners appear significantly less likely to claim
than the baseline category of private renters; however the coefficient loses significance for the
post-reform sample, while social tenants exhibit a significantly higher claiming probability,
possibly related to their better access to relevant information or higher exposure to the
‘lowering barriers’ policies. More years in employment and entitlement to the saving credit
component are also positively correlated with take-probability for the post reform sample.
Despite the unchanged sign of marginal effects between the pre- and post-reform sample
estimates, the fact that some of them are significant only for estimation on the post-reform
sample hints at some kind of structural change having taken place after the reform, and
the hypothesis of structural stability across survey years is rejected. This might reflect an
underlying change in take-up behaviour induced by the PC introduction, for example through
the reformed claiming environment experienced by pensioners observed in the post-reform
sample.
4.3 Matching algorithms
While the random design of the FRS sampling and the exogenous nature of the Pension
Credit introduction rule out the chance of endogenous selection into the pre- or post-reform
samples, bias might arise both from different patterns of non response in the two years and
the chance of demographic and socioeconomic trends affecting the underlying population.
Matching reduces the scope for such confounding factors. A variety of matching estimators
can be used, depending on the distance function to be minimized. One possibility is to
match on the conditional probability of being allocated to the post-reform, rather than the
pre-reform sample, usually referred to as ‘propensity score’ in the context of the evaluation
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literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). While random allocation of pensioners to the
pre- or post-reform sample would imply a 0.5 constant probability, any difference in non
response or population characteristics would result in a deviation from this value. In fact,
the parametric estimates of the propensity score, reported in Appendix Table A2, reveal
a significantly higher probability of single, more educated, non-white, non disabled and on
higher income to be sampled in the post-reform year, reflecting an expected trend in the
underlying population characteristics, evident from Table 3. Nearest neighbour matching on
the propensity score is performed with replacement for both samples baseline distribution
of covariates. Estimated propensity score distributions by sample, represented in Appendix
Figure A2, confirm the soundness of the common support Assumption 2.
A purely non parametric alternative is offered by ‘matching on variables’ algorithms. In
this case the choice of the nearest neighbour is aimed at minimizing the difference in pre-
and post- reform entitlements e0 and e1 between each matched pair of pensioners. Dis-
tance is measured using the Mahalanobis metric (Rubin, 1980), accounting for the within
sample-covariance of e0 and e1. As a further adjustment for confounding variables, matching
can be preceded by stratification, whereby each sample is partitioned into mutually exclusive
‘strata’, defined according to demographic characteristics. Both stratification by partnership
status and gender, and a finer one considering also age and years in employment 13 are imple-
mented. While realizing a closer conditioning on covariates, stratification reduces statistical
precision, depending on the size of available samples. Another option is the impositions of
a caliper, representing the maximum allowed distance between matched pairs, so that pairs
whose distance exceed the caliper would be discarded. While ensuring that matching quality
is not compromised by imbalances in the covariates distributions, this option also increases
standard errors.
The quality of conditioning achieved through matching can be gauged from the dis-
tribution of covariates in the unmatched and matched samples (Table A3 in Appendix).
13only for single females, samples numbers would not allow the same for couples or single male pensioners.
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While propensity score matching allows more observables to be conditioned on, matching
on variables gives a closer match on pre and post reform entitlement levels, and on further
characteristics when preceded by stratification. The imposition of a caliper gives more pre-
cise conditioning, although at the cost of a reduced support for the calculation of the reform
effect.
5 Results
Tables 5 and 6 report estimates of the ∆1 and ∆0 average treatment effects respectively,
computed using the different methods outlined in sections 3 and 4. The first column of
each table refers to the average reform effect on the set P of ‘treated’ pensioner units. The
Pension Credit introduction is found to bear a positive and significant impact on take-up
behaviour, consistent across the different conditioning methods adopted, and the choice of
the baseline covariates year. The average increase is estimated around 8 percentage points
from a baseline take-up probability of 0.58 under the parametric approach. The the size of
both ∆ˆ1 and ∆ˆ0 increases when matching on pre- and post- reform entitlements is used, with
∆ˆ1 exceeding 20 percentage points; despite the lower statistical precision, reflected by the
increased standard errors, the effect is still significant under the non parametric approach.
The imposition of the 0.05 caliper, ensuring a better matching quality, brings to a slightly
higher and still significant reform effect. When stratification by gender and partnership is
used, the average impact remains positive and significant while under finer stratification by
gender, partnership, age and years in employment, it looses significance under both choices
of the baseline covariates year. A consistently positive and significant effect, intermediate in
size between the purely parametric and purely non parametric cases is also obtained when
matching is based on the parametric estimation of the propensity score.
***** TABLES 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE *****
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The second column of Tables 5 and 6 presents the average reform effect on the take-up
probability of the subgroup P 1 of pensioners who were exposed to the reformed claiming
environment but did not face any increase in financial incentives. This group gathers the
‘poorest’ pensioners, who have most to gain from claiming in terms of entitlement and in
fact exhibit a relatively higher pre-reform take-up probability of 0.75. While the comparison
of the pre- and post-reform take-up sample averages would suggest a post reform claiming
decrease, such crude difference could simply reflect confounding factors, such as differences
in the distribution of covariates affecting the take-up decision in the two samples. Once
covariates are controlled for, either trough regression or matching, no significant impact of
the PC reform is generally found, with the only exception of a slight decrease in take-up
probability when the effect is measured by ∆ˆrp. ‘Lowering barriers’ policies, by themselves
seem to have been either insufficient or ineffective in triggering take-up, for this subgroup.
When the subgroup P 2 (third column) of pensioners who were ‘treated’ by both the
‘lowered barriers’ and the reform induced entitlement increase is considered, a sizeable and
significant positive reform impact on the take-up probability is consistently found across the
different conditioning methods and baseline covariates years. The size of the average increase
spans from about 10 percentage points, from a pre-reform take-up probability of 0.54, for
the parametric version under 2002/03 covariates, to more than 35 percentage points when
matching on pre and post reform entitlements under a 0.05 caliper is adopted for 2004/05
covariates. ∆ˆ1 remains significant even when finer stratification is used.
The last three columns of Tables 5 and 6 show the average reform effect on subgroups of
P 2 defined according to different ranges of reform induced increase in entitlement: below £5
per week, between £5 and £10 per week and above £10 per week. A positive gradient in the
take-up response to higher increases in entitlement emerges systematically under different
specifications of ∆ˆ1 and ∆ˆ0. While evidence of a reform-induced increase in take-up for
pensioners experiencing a less than £5 weekly increase is mixed, a consistently higher and
significant take-up response is apparent for the higher ranges of entitlement increase, with
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the difference in the average response for those who experienced a less than £5 increase
and a more than £10 increase statistically significant in most cases. Corresponding figures
produced separately for couples, single men and single women, show that while both couples
and single women exhibit a positive behavioral response to raised financial incentives, single
men seem to face higher barriers to claim and to react only to sizeable additions to the
monetary rewards.
Results so far have provided no evidence of a take-up response to the lowered claiming
barriers for pensioners unaffected by the new entitlement rules, but have revealed a signifi-
cant take-up increase for those who benefitted from increased financial incentives. Despite
resulting ineffective or insufficient for the first group, lowered claiming barriers might still
have played a role in amplifying the take-up response of pensioners in the second group.
Pensioners in P 2 might for example share characteristics making them more receptive to
such policies. Besides, it might be that ‘lowering barriers’ policies become effective only if
concurrent with raised financial incentives.
Table 7 presents estimates of Λ1 and Λ0, reflecting that part of the take-up response
to more generous benefit rules that would not have happened under unchanged pre-reform
claiming environment, or had the ‘lowering barriers’ policies not been implemented. As
expected no effect is found for P 1 pensioners, strengthening the previous conclusion about
the inefficacy of the ‘lowered barriers’ policies for this subgroup. However, a consistently
positive and significant effect, around 5− 6 percentage points, is found for P 2, pointing at a
concurrent contribution of the same policies in triggering the take-up response of the second
subgroup.
***** TABLES 7 ABOUT HERE *****
When Λt is estimated for different ranges of reform induced entitlement increases, it
becomes apparent that the ‘lowering barriers’ policies played a role for the subgroup of P 2
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experiencing a moderate entitlement increase, while for those with less than £5 and more
than £10 per week increases, Λˆt is significantly lower and possibly not statistically significant
when matching is used. The obtained results seem to suggest that, while ineffective if not
accompanied by a concurrent non trivial entitlement increase, ‘lowering barriers’ policies
appear superfluous when accompanied by a substantial financial incentive increase of £10
per week or more.
6 Conclusions
This study has shed some light on whether individuals’ claiming behaviour responds to finan-
cial incentives and to measures intended to lower non monetary claiming costs. Identification
of the behavioural response exploited an exogenous policy reform, the introduction of the
Pension Credit in UK in 2003, involving the implementation of ‘lowering barriers’ policies
and besides, for a subgroup of eligible pensioners, a real increase in the financial incentive
to claim. Because of the limited sample size of available panel data, and the high informa-
tion requirements necessary to the simulation of entitlements, repeated cross sections of a
particularly rich British dataset, the Family Resources Survey, were used. Both parametric
modelling and non parametric ‘selection on observables’ approaches to evaluation have been
implemented, providing fairly robust results.
A first research question concerned the overall effectiveness of the Pension Credit intro-
duction in increasing the take-up of pensioners who would have been entitled under both
the pre- and post-reform systems. The average effect on the treated was found positive and
significant across the different specifications implemented, supporting the idea that overall
the reform was successful in fostering new claims.
A second research question involved disentangling the role played by the ‘raising incen-
tives’ and lowering barriers’ policies. The ‘financial gain’ route, available to a subgroup of
pensioners only, appears to have been effective, as a positive gradient of take-up response
26
to higher increases in financial incentives was found. This result is consistent with previous
studies (Zantomio et al. 2008; Dahan et al. 2007) and confirms the idea that individuals’
claiming behaviour responds to financial incentives.
‘Lowering barriers’ policies seem to have partially enhanced the effect of financial in-
centives for pensioner who were treated by both types of measure. However, evidence of a
poorly enhancing effect for those who experienced a less than £5 per week or a more than
£10 per week increase in entitlement seems to suggest that only the presence of concurrent
financial incentives activate responsiveness to lowered barriers, while at the same time similar
measures become ‘superfluous’ once the financial reward increase exceeds £10 per week.
No evidence of a response to ‘lowering barriers’ policies per se was found, as no take-
up increase has emerged for pensioners who did not have their entitlement increased by the
reformed PC rules, despite being treated by the ‘lowering barriers’ policies. While pensioners
in this group exhibit relatively high take-up rates because of their relatively high entitlement
levels in the first place, it is for ‘highly resistant’ non-claimants in this groups that non
take-up has the most severe consequences in terms of poverty gap. The ‘lowering barriers’
policy alone, as implemented under the PC reform, does not appeared to have been effective
in tackling the issue.
Take-up is key to the effectiveness of existing targeted welfare programs. Individuals’
responsiveness to lowered barriers and raised financial incentives is crucial to the success of
policy interventions aimed at increasing it. This paper provides an answer to questions con-
cerning the relative and interacted efficacy of both routes. The finding that raised financial
incentives increase the probability of take up has important policy implications as it suggests
that there is scope for successful government intervention. The evidence that individuals re-
act more to increases in financial incentives than to lowered non monetary claiming costs is
suggestive as to which type of measures governments might want to concentrate resources
on. Clearly, further research on the effectiveness of lowering barrier policies - implemented
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in other contexts or other forms, or targeted at younger individuals - is required before any
sound conclusion can be drawn.
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Table 1: Pre- and post-reform benefit rates 
(pounds per week, 2003/04 prices) 
 
 single pensioner  pensioner couple 
  
MIG PC   MIG PC 
Needs:      
Basic Allowance (MIG or GC) 102.10 102.10  155.80 155.80 
Severe Disability premium 42.90 42.90  85.80 85.80 
Carer premium 25.10 25.10  50.20 50.20 
      
Saving Credit treshold - 77.35  - 123.80 
Maximum Saving Credit - 14.79  - 19.20 
      
Capital limits 6,000-12,000 6,000+  6,000-12,000 6,000+ 
Capital income ratio 1£ every 250£ 1£ every 500£   1£ every 250£ 1£ every 500£ 
Source: CPAG  (2003/04)           
 
 
Table  2a: Empirical entitlement levels and take-up rates, pre- and post-reform 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  P  P
1
 P
2
 sample Pre-reform Post-reform  Pre-reform Post-reform  Pre-reform Post-reform 
          
Nt  1,205 863  244 290  961 573 
          
Take-up, Tt
r=t,l=t mean 0.583 0.640  0.746 0.676  0.541 0.621 
 (std. er.) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.016) (0.020) 
Entitlement, er=t mean 28.842 38.945  55.396 53.465  22.100 31.597 
 (std. er.) (0.752) (0.914)  (2.000) (1.903)  (0.631) (0.830) 
          
  
Notes 
Pre-reform sample statistics are based on the FRS 2002/03; post-reform sample statistics on the FRS 2004/05.  
The set P includes all pensioner units who would have been eligible under pre- and post-reform rules. The partition P1 is restricted to pensioner units who 
did not have their entitlement increased by the reformed Pension Credit rules, while the partition P2 covers those who experienced a real increase in 
entitlement as a consequence of the Pension Credit introduction. 
Nt denotes sample number. 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
Table  2b: Empirical entitlement levels and take-up rates, pre- and post-reform 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  P  P
1
 P
2
 sample Pre-reform Post-reform  Pre-reform Post-reform  Pre-reform Post-reform 
          
Couples Nt 229 168  30 38  199 130 
Take-up, Tt
r=t,l=t mean 0.48 0.63  0.57 0.61  0.47 0.63 
 (std. er.) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Entitlement, er=t mean 27.63 42.45  58.68 69.94  22.95 34.41 
 (std. er.) (1.99) (2.54)  (6.59) (6.82)  (1.85) (2.16) 
          
Single male Nt 172 137  24 33  148 104 
Take-up, Tt
r=t,l=t mean 0.52 0.58  0.63 0.64  0.51 0.57 
 (std. er.) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.09)  (0.04) (0.05) 
Entitlement, er=t mean 26.43 34.32  66.62 47.47  19.91 30.15 
 (std. er.) (2.03) (1.93)  (7.56) (5.40)  (1.44) (1.70) 
          
Single female Nt 804 558  190 219  614 339 
Take-up, Tt
r=t,l=t mean 0.58 0.66  0.79 0.69  0.57 0.63 
 (std. er.) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) 
Entitlement, er=t mean 28.84 39.02  53.46 51.51  22.35 30.96 
 (std. er.) (0.75) (1.09)  (2.14) (2.02)  (0.71) (1.00) 
  
Notes 
Pre-reform sample statistics are based on the FRS 2002/03; post-reform sample statistics on the FRS 2004/05.  
The set P includes all pensioner units who would have been eligible under pre- and post-reform rules. The partition P1 is restricted to pensioner units who did not 
have their entitlement increased by the reformed Pension Credit rules, while the partition P2 covers those who experienced a real increase in entitlement as a 
consequence of the Pension Credit introduction. 
Nt denotes sample number. 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
Table 3: Sample statistics for conditioning covariates 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
    P   P1   P2
 
sample
Pre-reform Post-reform diff/sd  
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform diff/sd  
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform diff/sd 
couple mean .190 .195 .01  .123 .131 .02  .207 .227 .05 
 (s.d.) (.392) (.396)   (.329) (.338)   (.405) (.419)  
single female mean .684 .664 -.04  .795) .772 -.05  .656 .609 -.10 
 (s.d.) (.465) (.473)   (.404) (.420)   (.475) (.488)  
age (head) mean 77.74 77.35 -.06  74.668 76.41 .24  78.52 77.82 -.10 
 (s.d.) (7.12) (7.05)   (7.080) (7.369)   (6.91) (6.84)  
home owner mean 0.351 .386 .07  .262 .362 .21  .374 .398 .05 
 (s.d.) (0.477) (.487)   (.441) (.481)   (.484) (.490)  
years in employment (head) mean 31.90 31.25 -.04  27.13 25.81 -.07  33.11 34.00 .05 
 (s.d.) (17.52) (17.59)   (17.29) (17.93)   (17.38) (16.77)  
social tenant mean .571 .523 -.10  .631 .528 -.21  .556 .520 -.07 
 (s.d.) (.495) (.500)   (.483) (.500)   (.497) (.500)  
educated beyond  mean .341 .417 .15  .455 .493 .08  .312 .379 .14 
14 years old 
(s.d.) (.474) (.493)   (.499) (.501)   (.464) (.485)  
non white mean .152 .211 .14  .213 .276 .14  .136 .178 .11 
 (s.d.) (.359) (.408)   (.410) (.448)   (.343) (.383)  
anyone disabled mean .157 .127 -.09  .152 .134 -.05  .158 .124 -.10 
 (s.d.) (0.364) (.334)   (.359) (.342)   (.365) (.330)  
net income mean 104.19 109.33 .11  68.21 78.23 .29  113.32 125.07 .27 
 (s.d.) (42.51) (46.25)   (36.23) (34.34)   (39.01) (43.46)  
entitlement under MIG rules mean 28.84 32.37 .12  55.39 53.46 -.06  22.10 21.70 -.02 
 (s.d.) (26.10) (29.42)   (31.23) (32.41)   (19.57) (20.84)  
entitlement under PC rules mean 34.45 38.94 .17  55.39 53.46 -.06  29.14 31.59 .12 
 (s.d.) (24.35) (26.85)   (31.23) (32.41)   (18.90) (19.87)  
entitled to the Saving Credit  mean .793 .643 -.31  - -   .994 .969 -.14 
 component under PC 
(s.d.) (0.406) (0.479)     - -    (.079) (.175)   
Notes 
Pre-reform sample statistics are based on the FRS 2002/03; post-reform sample statistics on the FRS 2004/05.  
The set P includes all pensioner units who would have been eligible under pre- and post-reform rules. The partition P1 is restricted to pensioner units who did not have their entitlement increased by the 
reformed Pension Credit rules, while the partition P2 covers those who experienced a real increase in entitlement as a consequence of the Pension Credit introduction. 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
Table 4 : Parametric take-up probit estimates 
 
Marginal effects(standard errors in brakets) 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
Couple 0.072 0.100* 
 [0.212] [0.099] 
Age - head -0.051 0.028 
 [0.238] [0.556] 
Age squared - head 0.000 0.000 
 [0.287] [0.438] 
Female  0.049 0.098** 
 [0.295] [0.050] 
Tenure: home owner -0.201*** 0.009 
 [0.001] [0.887] 
Tenure: social tenant 0.058 0.198*** 
 [0.320] [0.001] 
Anyone educated beyond 14 -0.076** -0.072* 
 [0.031] [0.058] 
Non white - head -0.085* -0.178*** 
 [0.052] [0.000] 
Years in employment - head 0.000 0.003*** 
 [0.976] [0.003] 
Anyone registered as disabled 0.132*** 0.054 
 [0.003] [0.309] 
Net income -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln entitlelment: (below £10 pw) 0.213*** - 
 [0.000] - 
Lnentitlement: (£10-20 pw) 0.427*** 0.862** 
 [0.000] [0.015] 
Ln entitlement: (above £20pw) -0.054 0.06 
 [0.140] [0.129] 
Whether entitled to the saving credit - 0.090* 
 - [0.070] 
   
Number of Observations 1,204 863 
LR !2(k) 265.9 103.51 
Prob > !2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1626 0.0918 
Notes 
*** denotes coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level; **  denotes coefficient  statistically significant at 
the 5% level; *  denotes coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
 
Table 5: Estimates of impact !1 under 2004/05 baseline covariates 
   
 P
2
, by 
   
 Reform-induced entitlement increase 
(£ per week) 
Conditioning Method   
P P
1
P
2
 Less than 5 5-10 Above 10 
- Regression Actual, "1
ra
ATT .086 -.025 .142 
 .065 .122 .188 
  (se) (.016) (.025) (.020) 
 (.036) (.036) (.030) 
 Predicted, "1
rp
ATT .086 -.043 .151 
 .020 .113 .233 
  (se) (.006) (.006) (.007)  (.008) (.009) (.010) 
      
    
- Matching  no caliper ATT .213 .083 .279 
 .015 .268 .374 
  (se) (.058) (.101) (.072)  (.073) (.093) (.092) 
 caliper 0.5 ATT .228 .088 .361 
 .023 .431 .414 
  (se) (.061) (.102) (.086)  (.093) (.122) (.103) 
  %dropped .07 .01 .21 
 .35 .33 .26 
     
    
- Matching+ stratification  3 strata ATT .19 .01 .28 
 -.01 .21 .329 
  (se) (.075) (.109) (.095)  (.086) (.135) (.128) 
 3 strata ATT .208 .029 .369 
 .122 .280 .356 
 
caliper 0.5 
(se) (.078) (.111) (.115)  (.105) (.154) (.145) 
  %dropped 10.66 3.79 24.26 
 26.87 22.88 34.27 
      
    
 10 strata ATT .105 -.103 .211 
 .015 .170 .336 
  (se) (.117) (.198) (.137)  (.175) (.204) (.191) 
 10 strata ATT .113 -.092 .263 
 - - - 
 
caliper 0.5 
(se) (.130) (.205) (.161) 
 - - - 
  %dropped 20.86 10.34 30.89 
 - - - 
      
    
- Propensity score  ATT .093 -.059 .101 
 -.030 .103 .234 
  (se) (.030) (.061) (.044)  (.075) (.082) (.067) 
Notes 
The set P includes all pensioner units who would have been eligible under pre- and post-reform rules. The partition P1 is restricted to pensioner units who did not have their entitlement increased by the reformed 
Pension Credit rules, while the partition P2 covers those who experienced a real increase in entitlement as a consequence of the Pension Credit introduction. 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
Table 6: Estimates of impact !0 under 2002/03 baseline covariates 
   
 P
2
, by 
   
 Reform-induced entitlement increase 
(£ per week) 
Conditioning Method   
P P
1
P
2
 Less than 5 5-10 Above 10 
- Regression Actual, "0
ra
ATT .077 -.022 .102 
 
.001 .107 .233 
  (se) (.014) (.028) (.016) 
 
(.023) (.032) (.028) 
 Predicted, "0
rp
ATT .077 -.027 .103 
 
.015 .129 .197 
  (se) (.004) (.007) (.005)  (.005) (.006) (.010) 
      
    
- Matching  no caliper ATT .111 -.061 .153 
 
.157 .193 .189 
  (se) (.058) (.092) (.063)  (.128) (.064) (.065) 
 caliper 0.5 ATT .126 -.064 .183 
 
.139 .240 .238 
  (se) (.061) (.093) (.072)  (.075) (.069) (.076) 
  %dropped 7.22 3.69 19.35 
 
41.62 13.70 30.64 
     
    
- Matching+ stratification  3 strata ATT .08 -.05 .15 
 .12 .16 .246 
  (se) (.07) (.11) (.08)  (.13) (.10) (.10) 
 3 strata ATT .08 -.06 .16 
 
.13 .20 .29 
 
caliper 0.5 
(se) (.08) (.11) (.08)  (.08) (.10) (.11) 
  %dropped 7.22 4.92 24.45 
 
45.69 20.37 33.33 
      
    
 10 strata ATT .041 -.016 .096 
 
-.025 .104 .222 
  (se) (.106) (.173) (.123)  (.169) (.189) (.178) 
 10 strata ATT .046 -.033 .135 
 
- - - 
 
caliper 0.5 
(se) (.118) (.173) (.135) 
 
- - - 
  %dropped 18.17 12.70 29.97 
 
- - - 
      
    
- Propensity score  ATT .083 -.029 .140 
 
.028 .125 .239 
  (se) (.030) (.067) (.043)  (.080) (.063) (.065) 
Notes 
The set P includes all pensioner units who would have been eligible under pre- and post-reform rules. The partition P1 is restricted to pensioner units who did not have their entitlement increased by the reformed 
Pension Credit rules, while the partition P2 covers those who experienced a real increase in entitlement as a consequence of the Pension Credit introduction. 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
  
 
Table 7:  Estimates of impact "0 and "1
 
 "1  "0
   P2   P2 
   
Reform induced entitlement 
increase  
(£ per week)   
Reform induced entitlement 
increase  
(£ per week) 
   
P P1 P2 
less 5 5-10 above10   
P P1 P2 
less 5 5-10 above10 
Regression               
 actual "
ra
.045 .018 .059 .058 .134 .027  ATT .043 -.005 .055 .037 .151 -.004 
  (se) (.012) (.022) (.013) (.036) (.023) (.016)  (se) (.011) (.024) (.012) (.019) (.021) (.022) 
               
 predicted "
rp
.045 .000 .068 .014 .125 .064  ATT .043 .000 .054 .023 .129 .027 
  (se) (.012) (.004) (.018) (.005) (.028) (.033)  (se) (.012) (.004) (.016) (.006) (.037) (.036) 
               
Regression+Matching(b1,b2)            
 actual "
ram
.039 .018 .050 .042 .108 .022  ATT .05 -.005 .059 .009 .154 .040 
  (se) (.013) (.025) (.014) (.039) (.025) (.017)  (se) (.015) (.025) (.018) (.021) (.037) (.039) 
               
 predicted "
rpm
.039 .000 .059 -.002 .099 .066  ATT .047 .000 .059 -.005 .133 .076 
  (se) (.011) (.003) (.017) (.004) (.026) (.031)  (se) (.009) (.003) (.011) (.002) (.022) (.030) 
 
Notes 
 "1 is derived under 2004/05 baseline covariates; "0 is derived under 2002/03 baseline covariates 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: Sample descriptive statistics: UK pensioners and eligible pensioners 
    
pensioners sampled in FRS 
2002/03   
pensioners sampled in FRS 
2004/05 
    eligible to MIG Uk 1   eligible to PC Uk 1  
            
number of pensioner units  1,205 8,599  1,683 8,625 
       
living in couple mean .324 .564  .332 .567 
 (se) (.012) (.000)  (.015) (.000) 
single male mean .119 .105  .131 .107 
 (se) (.009) (.000)  (.011) (.000) 
single female mean .558 .331  .537 .326 
 (se) (.013) (.000)  (.016) (.000) 
age mean 77.043 73.380  76.553 73.524 
 (se) (.191) (.002)  (.224) (.002) 
any ed. qualification mean .098 .281  .054 .205 
 (se) (.008) (.000)  (.007) (.000) 
non white mean .129 .056  .043 .036 
 (se) (.009) (.000)  (.006) (.000) 
living with others in hh mean .000 .136  .000 .126 
 (se) (.000) (.000)  (.000) (.000) 
economically active mean .010 .073  .006 .080 
 (se) (.003) (.000)  (.002) (.000) 
retired in last year mean .003 .018  .010 .018 
 (se) (.002) (.000)  (.003) (.000) 
receive maintenace from absent partner mean .000 .001  .000 .001 
 (se) (.000) (.000)  (.000) (.000) 
pending mortgage mean .000 .074  .000 .069 
 (se) (.000) (.000)  (.000) (.000) 
tenure: own mean .377 .728  .408 .758 
 (se) (.013) (.000)  (.015) (.000) 
tenure: social renter mean .545 .228  .495 .197 
 (se) (.013) (.000)  (.016) (.000) 
receving disability benefit mean .286 .160  .284 .169 
 (se) (.012) (.000)  (.014) (.000) 
in council tax band a or b  mean .610 .428  .725 .427 
 (se) (.013) (.000)  (.014) (.000) 
equivament hh non benefit income mean 3.137 28.182  3.683 30.731 
 (se) (.139) (.029)  (.284) (.030) 
personal income  mean 140.913 193.437  152.779 215.235
 (se) (1.589) (.083)  (2.143) (.061) 
whether holds investments mean .044 .273  .037 .259 
 (se) (.005) (.000)  (.006) (.000) 
              
1 Uk estimates are weighted to correct for sample design and survey non response. 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
 
 
TABLE A2: Propensity score Probit regression estimates 
 
 
 Marginal effects 
 [absolute value of z statistics] 
pensioner couple -.105*** 
 [2.71] 
female head -.052 
 [1.59] 
anyone educated beyond 14 .096*** 
 [4.10] 
non white head .087*** 
 [2.99] 
years worked - head -.001 
 [1.16] 
anyone registered as disabled -.096*** 
 [3.00] 
net income .001*** 
 [4.22] 
  
Number of observations 2,068 
LR X2(7) 47.34 
Prob > X2 .0000 
Pseudo R2 .0168 
Notes 
* statistically significant at the  10% level ; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** 
statistically significant at the 1% level 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
 
TABLE A3: Covariates sample mean in unmatched and matched samples 
 
  2002/03 as conterfactual to 2004/05  2004/05 as conterfactual to 2002/03 
  unmatched matched  unmatched matched 
Matching on e
0
,e
1
Treated 
2004/05 
Controls 
2002/03 
Treated 
2004/05 
Controls 
2002/03  
Treated 
2002/03 
Controls 
2004/05 
Treated 
2002/03 
Controls 
2004/05 
no caliper e0 32.37 28.84 - 31.29  28.84 32.37 - 30.38 
 e1 38.94 34.45 - 37.80  34.45 38.94 - 35.99 
0.05 caliper e0 32.37 28.84 30.59 29.71  28.84 32.37 26.93 28.54 
 e1 38.94 34.45 36.57 35.69  34.45 38.94 31.99 33.53 
0.01 caliper e0 32.37 28.84 31.94 31.75  28.84 32.37 36.97 37.27 
 e1 38.94 34.45 37.18 36.99  34.45 38.94 40.28 40.54 
           
3 strata,no caliper  e0 32.37 28.84 - 31.08  28.84 32.37 - 31.37 
 e1 38.94 34.45 - 37.50  34.45 38.94 - 36.91 
 Couple .194 .190 - .194  .190 .195 - .190 
10 strata, no caliper e0 32.37 28.84 - 30.51  28.84 32.37 - 31.29 
 e1 38.94 34.45 - 36.85  34.45 38.94 - 36.82 
 Couple .194 0.190 - .194  .190 .195 - .190 
 Age head 77.35 77.741 - 76.92  77.74 77.35 - 77.95 
           
Propensity score           
 e
e
0 32.37 28.84 - 29.23  28.84 32.37 - 32.39 
 1 38.94 34.45 - 35.32  34.45 38.94 - 38.53 
 Net income  109.33 104.19 - 109.14  104.19 109.33 - 107.13 
 Couple .195 .190 - .198  .190 .195 - .222 
 Age (head) 77.35 77.74 - 77.56  77.74 77.35 - 77.70 
 Female .664 .684 - .629  .684 .664 - .682 
 Educ.above 14 .417 .341 - .417  .341 .417 - .344 
 Years worked 31.25 31.90 - 31.21  31.90 31.25 - 32.36 
 Anyone disabled .127 .157 - .144  0.157 .127 - .168 
Source: Author`s calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 
FIGURE A1: Predicted probability of take-up  
 
 
Notes 
Probability of take-up estimated on each sample, for a representative single man aged 75 years old, homeowner, educated above 14, white, who worked 33 year and has a net income of £100 per week 
(continuous line) and for a representative single woman, aged 89 years old, disabled, educated below 14, white, who worked 20 years and has a net income of £45 per week (dashed line). 
   
FIGURE A2: Estimated propensity score distributions 
 
 
 
 
  Notes 
  In the top panel graphs ‘treated’ refers to pensioners sampled in 2004/05 FRS  and ‘controls’ to pensioners sampled in 
2002/03 FRS; in the bottom panel graphs  ‘treated’ refers to pensioners sampled in 2002/03 FRS and ‘controls’ to 
pensioners sampled in 2004/05 FRS. 
